Grid and clean energy
NordShifts Warden: a quiet security guard for substations and power plants
Warden is a small sensor that listens to the control network of a substation, solar park, wind farm or battery. It never sends anything to that network. It learns what normal looks like, notices when something changes, links the alerts into incidents and writes signed evidence that a regulator, an insurer or a lender can check. Below, it runs on a 24-hour test day with 13 planted attacks.
Test data: a synthetic substation day with invented devices and documentation IP addresses. No real plant data.
- attacks found on the test day
- 13/13
- attacks found on the test day
- false alarm in 24 hours
- 1
- false alarm in 24 hours
- incidents built from 31 alerts
- 14
- incidents built from 31 alerts
- packets sent to the plant network
- 0
- packets sent to the plant network
What Warden does
Five steps, all on the plant's own hardware. There is no NordShifts cloud and no licence server.
- 1
Listens
A copy of the network traffic comes from a mirror port on the plant switch. Warden's capture port can only receive.
- 2
Understands
It reads Modbus, IEC 60870-5-104, S7 and remote-access sessions down to each command, set point and measurement, and names every device it hears.
- 3
Detects
Signed detection modules check protocol rules, the physics of the measurements and a learned traffic model. Each runs sealed off, with no access to files or the network.
- 4
Links
Alerts that belong together become one incident with stages: entry, reconnaissance, action and effect. A night intrusion is one story, not ten alarms.
- 5
Proves
Every alert goes into a hash chain. Incident packs, NIS2 drafts and reports for insurers are signed with classic and post-quantum keys.
Plant control network
Warden sensor
- Protocol rules
- Process physics
- Traffic model
- Device identity
- Remote access
- 1Alerts to the operator's SIEM
- 2Signed incident packs
- 3Reports for insurers and lenders
Nothing goes back into the plant network
The test substation in 3D
Every device Warden saw on the test day, wired to the plant switch, with the Warden sensor on its mirror port. Play the whole day or pick one attack: each alert travels as a light along the path it took, and devices turn red while they are under attack.
Time (UTC): 02:20
Drag to turn · scroll or pinch to zoom
02:24: someone opens a VNC session to the engineering workstation from an unknown internet address, outside agreed hours. Ten minutes later, at 02:34, a new program is downloaded to the PLC. Warden links the two into one incident: entry to action in 600 seconds.
Latest alerts
- No alerts yet in this part of the day.
Normal control trafficMirror copy to WardenAlert path
Every alert of the day, by detector
Every alert of the day, by detector
31 alerts in 24 hours. Most come in tight clusters, one per attack, which is why Warden links them into incidents.
HighMediumLow
How fast each attack was found
Seconds from the start of the attack to Warden's first alert. Network attacks are found in under a second; slow ones such as a frozen measurement need minutes of evidence.
What an attack on the battery could cost
A 10 MW / 20 MWh battery's average earnings by hour on Latvian day-ahead prices over 90 days, with the three incidents that touched the battery.
Which detector found what
Attacks found by each detection module, and the one false alarm of the day. Most attacks are caught by two different detectors.
From 31 alerts to 14 incidents
Warden groups alerts by the devices involved and the time between them, and orders them by stage. The operator reads 14 stories instead of 31 alarms; 10 need attention.
| Start (UTC) | Severity | Stages | Devices |
|---|---|---|---|
| 00:57 | Medium | entry | Hidden cellular router 10.10.5.1 |
| 00:57 | High | entry | RTU 10.10.1.14, Internet 198.51.100.99 |
| 02:24 | High | entry → actionentry to action: 600 s | Engineering workstation 10.10.0.20, PLC 10.10.3.31, Internet 198.51.100.66 |
| 07:12 | High | entry → reconnaissance → actionentry to action: 0.4 s | RTU 10.10.1.12, Unknown laptop 10.10.9.66 |
| 08:24 | High | entry → actionentry to action: 15.4 s | Solar inverter 10.10.4.42, Internet 192.0.2.77 |
| 09:36 | High | reconnaissance → action | Battery controller 10.10.2.21, Unknown laptop 10.10.9.66 |
| 10:52 | Medium | effect | RTU 10.10.1.11 |
| 12:00 | High | entry → reconnaissance → actionentry to action: 1.8 s | Battery inverter 10.10.2.22, Unknown laptop 10.10.9.66 |
| 14:00 | High | action | Battery controller 10.10.2.21 |
| 14:24 | High | entry → reconnaissance → effect | RTU 10.10.1.14, Unknown laptop 10.10.9.66 |
| 16:37 | Medium | reconnaissance | SCADA master 10.10.0.10, RTU 10.10.1.12 |
| 16:48 | High | action | SCADA master 10.10.0.10, Battery controller 10.10.2.21 |
| 19:12 | Medium | effect | RTU 10.10.1.13 |
| 21:37 | High | effect | SCADA master 10.10.0.10, RTU 10.10.1.11 |
Who made the equipment
Warden names each device from what it says on the network (SNMP, Modbus device identification, S7, EtherNet/IP, web servers), matches it to vendor advisories and checks it against the operator's list of blocked suppliers. The register is signed.
| Device | Product and firmware | Advisories | Supplier |
|---|---|---|---|
| RTU 10.10.1.11 | Example Industrial EX-RTU 500, firmware V4.1.3 | WARDEN-TEST-2026-002 | Blocked by policy |
| RTU 10.10.1.12 | Example Industrial EX-RTU 500, firmware V4.1.3 | WARDEN-TEST-2026-002 | Blocked by policy |
| RTU 10.10.1.13 | Example Industrial EX-RTU 500, firmware V4.1.3 | WARDEN-TEST-2026-002 | Blocked by policy |
| RTU 10.10.1.14 | Example Industrial EX-RTU 500, firmware V4.1.3 | WARDEN-TEST-2026-002 | Blocked by policy |
| Battery controller 10.10.2.21 | EX-PCS 1000 battery inverter | WARDEN-TEST-2026-001, WARDEN-TEST-2026-004 | Blocked by policy |
| Battery inverter 10.10.2.22 | EX-M300 power meter | WARDEN-TEST-2026-003 | Blocked by policy |
| PLC 10.10.3.31 | – | Allowed | |
| Solar inverter 10.10.4.41 | – | Allowed | |
| Solar inverter 10.10.4.42 | – | Blocked by policy |
Evidence that others can check
NIS2 incident packs
An early warning within 24 hours and a 72-hour notification, drafted in English and Latvian, with the alerts and captures attached and signed.
Remote-access statements
For solar, wind and battery plants: which manufacturer clouds and remote sessions reached the plant, in English and Lithuanian.
Reports for insurers and lenders
Which controls were working over a period, what was found and how fast, as one signed file.
Post-quantum signatures
Each signature is Ed25519 plus ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), so evidence written today stays verifiable later.
Open about itself
A CycloneDX software bill of materials, signed releases, a security policy and a Cyber Resilience Act file come with every version.
What this demo is and is not
Everything on this page comes from a real Warden run on a synthetic test day: a generated substation network with planted attacks, invented device makers and documentation IP addresses. It shows how Warden works and how fast it finds these attacks; it is not a result from a live plant. Warden is a pilot. A trial on your own mirror port is how to see what it finds on your network.
Try Warden on your own network
A pilot needs a mirror port, a small computer and a few days of normal traffic. Captures and alerts stay on your hardware.