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Grid and clean energy

NordShifts Warden: a quiet security guard for substations and power plants

Warden is a small sensor that listens to the control network of a substation, solar park, wind farm or battery. It never sends anything to that network. It learns what normal looks like, notices when something changes, links the alerts into incidents and writes signed evidence that a regulator, an insurer or a lender can check. Below, it runs on a 24-hour test day with 13 planted attacks.

Test data: a synthetic substation day with invented devices and documentation IP addresses. No real plant data.

attacks found on the test day
13/13
attacks found on the test day
false alarm in 24 hours
1
false alarm in 24 hours
incidents built from 31 alerts
14
incidents built from 31 alerts
packets sent to the plant network
0
packets sent to the plant network

What Warden does

Five steps, all on the plant's own hardware. There is no NordShifts cloud and no licence server.

  1. 1

    Listens

    A copy of the network traffic comes from a mirror port on the plant switch. Warden's capture port can only receive.

  2. 2

    Understands

    It reads Modbus, IEC 60870-5-104, S7 and remote-access sessions down to each command, set point and measurement, and names every device it hears.

  3. 3

    Detects

    Signed detection modules check protocol rules, the physics of the measurements and a learned traffic model. Each runs sealed off, with no access to files or the network.

  4. 4

    Links

    Alerts that belong together become one incident with stages: entry, reconnaissance, action and effect. A night intrusion is one story, not ten alarms.

  5. 5

    Proves

    Every alert goes into a hash chain. Incident packs, NIS2 drafts and reports for insurers are signed with classic and post-quantum keys.

Where Warden sits

Plant control network

Switch
Mirror port: copy only

Warden sensor

  • Protocol rules
  • Process physics
  • Traffic model
  • Device identity
  • Remote access
  • 1Alerts to the operator's SIEM
  • 2Signed incident packs
  • 3Reports for insurers and lenders

Nothing goes back into the plant network

The test substation in 3D

Every device Warden saw on the test day, wired to the plant switch, with the Warden sensor on its mirror port. Play the whole day or pick one attack: each alert travels as a light along the path it took, and devices turn red while they are under attack.

Time (UTC): 02:20

Drag to turn · scroll or pinch to zoom

02:24: someone opens a VNC session to the engineering workstation from an unknown internet address, outside agreed hours. Ten minutes later, at 02:34, a new program is downloaded to the PLC. Warden links the two into one incident: entry to action in 600 seconds.

Latest alerts

  • No alerts yet in this part of the day.

Normal control trafficMirror copy to WardenAlert path

Every alert of the day, by detector

Every alert of the day, by detector

31 alerts in 24 hours. Most come in tight clusters, one per attack, which is why Warden links them into incidents.

Hidden uplinksRemote accessPLC program changesProtocol rulesTraffic model (ONNX)Manufacturer cloudsProcess physicsDevice identityVulnerability advisoriesLoss of view00:0003:0006:0009:0012:0015:0018:0021:0024:00Hour of the day (UTC)00:57 · Medium · New DHCP server · 10.10.5.100:57 · Medium · Remote-access session from a new source · 198.51.100.99 → 10.10.1.1400:57 · Medium · Remote-access session outside agreed hours · 198.51.100.99 → 10.10.1.1400:57 · High · New path to the internet · 10.10.1.14 → 198.51.100.9902:24 · Medium · Remote-access session from a new source · 198.51.100.66 → 10.10.0.2002:24 · Medium · Remote-access session outside agreed hours · 198.51.100.66 → 10.10.0.2002:34 · High · PLC program download · 10.10.0.20 → 10.10.3.3102:34 · High · Control commands during a remote-access session · 198.51.100.66 → 10.10.3.3107:12 · Medium · New device talking to the plant · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.1.1207:12 · High · New device sends a command to the plant · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.1.1207:12 · High · Unusual traffic on this link · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.1.1208:24 · High · Connection to a blocked manufacturer's cloud · 10.10.4.42 → 192.0.2.7708:24 · Medium · Device reaches the internet for the first time · 10.10.4.42 → 192.0.2.7708:24 · High · Large download from a blocked manufacturer's cloud · 10.10.4.42 → 192.0.2.7709:36 · High · New device sends a command to the plant · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.2.2109:36 · High · Unusual traffic on this link · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.2.2110:52 · Medium · Measurement frozen · 10.10.1.1112:00 · Medium · New device talking to the plant · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.2.2212:00 · High · New device sends a command to the plant · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.2.2212:00 · High · Function scan · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.2.2212:00 · High · Unusual traffic on this link · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.2.2214:00 · High · Firmware downgraded · 10.10.2.2114:00 · High · Known vulnerability applies: WARDEN-TEST-2026-001 · 10.10.2.2114:24 · Medium · New device talking to the plant · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.1.1414:24 · High · Message flood · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.1.1414:24 · High · Unusual traffic on this link · 10.10.9.66 → 10.10.1.1416:37 · Medium · Unusual traffic on this link · 10.10.0.10 → 10.10.1.1216:48 · High · Set point outside its learned range · 10.10.0.10 → 10.10.2.2119:12 · Medium · Measurement jumped · 10.10.1.1321:37 · High · Device stopped reporting · 10.10.1.11 → 10.10.0.1022:06 · Low · Device reporting again · 10.10.1.11 → 10.10.0.10

HighMediumLow

How fast each attack was found

Seconds from the start of the attack to Warden's first alert. Network attacks are found in under a second; slow ones such as a frozen measurement need minutes of evidence.

0.11101001k10kSeconds to the first alert (log scale)Hidden cellular uplink< 0.1 sRemote access from a new source< 0.1 sBattery set-point manipulation< 0.1 sUpdate from a blocked manufacturer cloud< 0.1 sInterrogation flood< 0.1 sPLC program download0.2 sUnauthorised breaker command0.2 sModbus write from a new device0.5 sFunction scan0.5 sVoltage measurement offset5.7 sLoss of view2 minFrozen measurement4 minFirmware downgrade48 min

What an attack on the battery could cost

A 10 MW / 20 MWh battery's average earnings by hour on Latvian day-ahead prices over 90 days, with the three incidents that touched the battery.

Which detector found what

Attacks found by each detection module, and the one false alarm of the day. Most attacks are caught by two different detectors.

From 31 alerts to 14 incidents

Warden groups alerts by the devices involved and the time between them, and orders them by stage. The operator reads 14 stories instead of 31 alarms; 10 need attention.

Start (UTC)SeverityStagesDevices
00:57MediumentryHidden cellular router 10.10.5.1
00:57HighentryRTU 10.10.1.14, Internet 198.51.100.99
02:24Highentry → actionentry to action: 600 sEngineering workstation 10.10.0.20, PLC 10.10.3.31, Internet 198.51.100.66
07:12Highentry → reconnaissance → actionentry to action: 0.4 sRTU 10.10.1.12, Unknown laptop 10.10.9.66
08:24Highentry → actionentry to action: 15.4 sSolar inverter 10.10.4.42, Internet 192.0.2.77
09:36Highreconnaissance → actionBattery controller 10.10.2.21, Unknown laptop 10.10.9.66
10:52MediumeffectRTU 10.10.1.11
12:00Highentry → reconnaissance → actionentry to action: 1.8 sBattery inverter 10.10.2.22, Unknown laptop 10.10.9.66
14:00HighactionBattery controller 10.10.2.21
14:24Highentry → reconnaissance → effectRTU 10.10.1.14, Unknown laptop 10.10.9.66
16:37MediumreconnaissanceSCADA master 10.10.0.10, RTU 10.10.1.12
16:48HighactionSCADA master 10.10.0.10, Battery controller 10.10.2.21
19:12MediumeffectRTU 10.10.1.13
21:37HigheffectSCADA master 10.10.0.10, RTU 10.10.1.11

Who made the equipment

Warden names each device from what it says on the network (SNMP, Modbus device identification, S7, EtherNet/IP, web servers), matches it to vendor advisories and checks it against the operator's list of blocked suppliers. The register is signed.

DeviceProduct and firmwareAdvisoriesSupplier
RTU 10.10.1.11Example Industrial EX-RTU 500, firmware V4.1.3WARDEN-TEST-2026-002Blocked by policy
RTU 10.10.1.12Example Industrial EX-RTU 500, firmware V4.1.3WARDEN-TEST-2026-002Blocked by policy
RTU 10.10.1.13Example Industrial EX-RTU 500, firmware V4.1.3WARDEN-TEST-2026-002Blocked by policy
RTU 10.10.1.14Example Industrial EX-RTU 500, firmware V4.1.3WARDEN-TEST-2026-002Blocked by policy
Battery controller 10.10.2.21EX-PCS 1000 battery inverterWARDEN-TEST-2026-001, WARDEN-TEST-2026-004Blocked by policy
Battery inverter 10.10.2.22EX-M300 power meterWARDEN-TEST-2026-003Blocked by policy
PLC 10.10.3.31–Allowed
Solar inverter 10.10.4.41–Allowed
Solar inverter 10.10.4.42–Blocked by policy

Evidence that others can check

  • NIS2 incident packs

    An early warning within 24 hours and a 72-hour notification, drafted in English and Latvian, with the alerts and captures attached and signed.

  • Remote-access statements

    For solar, wind and battery plants: which manufacturer clouds and remote sessions reached the plant, in English and Lithuanian.

  • Reports for insurers and lenders

    Which controls were working over a period, what was found and how fast, as one signed file.

  • Post-quantum signatures

    Each signature is Ed25519 plus ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204), so evidence written today stays verifiable later.

  • Open about itself

    A CycloneDX software bill of materials, signed releases, a security policy and a Cyber Resilience Act file come with every version.

What this demo is and is not

Everything on this page comes from a real Warden run on a synthetic test day: a generated substation network with planted attacks, invented device makers and documentation IP addresses. It shows how Warden works and how fast it finds these attacks; it is not a result from a live plant. Warden is a pilot. A trial on your own mirror port is how to see what it finds on your network.

Try Warden on your own network

A pilot needs a mirror port, a small computer and a few days of normal traffic. Captures and alerts stay on your hardware.

NordShifts Warden: a quiet security guard for substations…